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Abstract: 
Objective self-awareness theory contends that focusing attention on the self initiates an 
automatic comparison of self to standards. To gain evidence for automatic self–standard 
comparison processes, two experiments manipulated attention to self with subliminal first-name 
priming. People completed a computer-based parity task after being instructed that the standard 
was to be fast or to be accurate. Subliminal first-name priming increased behavioral adherence to 
the explicit standard. When told to be fast, self-focused people made more mistakes and had 
faster response times; when told to be accurate, self-focused people made fewer mistakes. A 
manipulation of conscious self-awareness (via a mirror) had the same self-regulatory effects. The 
findings suggest that comparing self to standards can occur automatically and that it is attention 
to self, not awareness of the self per se, that evokes self-evaluation. 
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Article: 
The capacity for self-awareness is one source of the enormous complexity in human thought and 
action: people can represent the self abstractly, think about their thoughts and experience, and 
judge their ideas and actions in light of abstract goals and standards (Carver, 2003). The social 
psychology of self-awareness was started by objective self-awareness theory (Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund & Duval, 1971), which examines the cognitive, motivational, and 
affective consequences of focusing attention on the self. Many experiments since Duval and 
Wicklund's influential book have shown that self-focused attention has important implications 
for motivation and self-regulation (see Carver, 2003; Duval & Silvia, 2001; Gibbons, 1990; 
Silvia & Duval, 2001a, for reviews). 
Of the many effects of self-focused attention, two are most widely known. First, focusing 
attention on the self can lead to conscious awareness of the self. People begin to have conscious 
thoughts about the self, and they experience a subjective sense of self-consciousness (Silvia & 
Gendolla, 2001). Duval and Wicklund (1972) labeled this state “objective self-awareness.” 
Second, focusing attention on the self leads to a process of self-evaluation. Duval and Wicklund 
assumed that self-evaluation consisted of comparing the self to a standard of correctness that 
specifies a state the self ought to have. 
Many experiments support objective self-awareness theory's predictions about the role of self-
focused attention in initiating self-evaluation (see Carver & Scheier, 1998; Duval & Silvia, 2001; 
Silvia & Duval, 2004). Manipulating self-focused attention—such as with mirrors, video 
cameras, and observers—increases many affective and behavioral markers of self-evaluation. For 
example, high self-focus leads people to compare self to standards (Gibbons, 1978; Hormuth, 
1982; Scheier & Carver, 1983), to mobilize effort to meet their standards (Gendolla, Richter, & 
Silvia, 2008; Silvia, Jones, Kelly, & Zibaie, 2011a; Silvia, McCord, & Gendolla, 2010), to feel 
better after succeeding and worse after failing (Duval & Silvia, 2002; Ickes, Wicklund, & Ferris, 
1973), and to respond defensively when success is unlikely (Duval & Lalwani, 1999; Duval & 
Silvia, 2002; Silvia & Duval, 2001b). 
A long-standing question in self-awareness research is whether conscious awareness of the self is 
necessary for self-evaluation to occur. Objective self-awareness theory maintains that the 
dynamics of self-evaluation can operate automatically, in the sense of occurring quickly and 
unintentionally (see Duval & Silvia, 2001; Silvia & Duval, 2001a, pp. 237–238). Certainly, 
people can deliberately reflect on the self and evaluate it relative to their personal standards. But 
according to the theory, self-evaluation needn't be intentional and deliberate. If attention is 
directed to self, the self will automatically be compared to standards, and attention can be 
directed to self-knowledge without a conscious experience of self-awareness. Attention is 
routinely allocated in the absence of awareness of its target, such as in early-stage object 
identification and vigilance for masked objects (e.g., Lachter, Forster, & Ruthruff, 2004; 
McCormick, 1997; Mogg & Bradley, 1999), so attention to self needn't require conscious 
awareness of the self. 
Despite the theory's claims that self-evaluation processes can occur automatically, research hasn't 
yet tested its predictions. Automatic comparison of self and standards seems intuitively plausible, 
but there is no direct evidence that the dynamics of self-evaluation assumed by the theory—
attention to self initiates a comparison of self against standards—can operate without using 
obvious, conscious reminders of the self. Furthermore, there is no solid indirect evidence that can 
be mustered from the literature on self-awareness. The standard manipulations of self-focused 
attention—placing people in front of mirrors (Carver & Scheier, 1978), showing people their 
images on TV monitors (Silvia & Phillips, 2004), introducing observers (Carver & Scheier, 
1978), and making people aware that they stick out in some way (Silvia & Eichstaedt, 2004; 
Snow, Duval, & Silvia, 2004)—affect self-focused attention in ways that induce conscious 
awareness of the self. Thus, direct tests of automatic self-evaluation are required. 
Assuming that self-evaluation can occur either deliberately or automatically, how are these 
similar? Theories of self-evaluation vary regarding the relationship between automatic and 
controlled self-evaluation. The dual-evaluation model, for example, proposes that “implicit and 
explicit self-evaluations represent two qualitatively different kinds of self-evaluation” (Koole, 
Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2001, p. 670). Automatic self-evaluation is primarily 
associationistic (Dijksterhuis, 2004), whereas controlled evaluation involves “sophisticated 
cognitive judgments of the self” (Koole et al., 2001, p. 670). Regarding outcomes, automatic 
self-evaluation processes affect implicit self-esteem, and conscious self-evaluation processes 
affect explicit self-esteem (see also Bosson, Brown, Zeigler-Hill, & Swann, 2003). 
Objective self-awareness theory, in contrast, assumes that automatic and controlled self-
evaluation processes have some important qualitative similarities (Duval & Silvia, 2001). 
Automatic and controlled self-evaluation processes aren't similar in all respects, of course, but 
they should share some antecedents and consequences. Comparing self to its goals and standards 
is a central mechanism in human behavior control (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1998), so it ought to 
be robust, versatile, and applicable across a wide range of inputs, goals, and contexts. If the 
comparison and regulation processes happened only when both self and goals were in conscious 
awareness, then the self-regulatory system would have relatively limited control over action. 
Thus, the core processes of self-evaluation—attention to self initiates comparing self to a 
standard—should be similar regardless of whether the processes unfold in or out of awareness. 
The Present Experiments 
The present experiments examined objective self-awareness theory's predictions about automatic 
aspects of the self-evaluation process. In two experiments, we manipulated attention to self 
outside of awareness via subliminal first-name priming (Experiments 1 and 2) or consciously 
with a mirror (Experiment 2), and we presented people with an explicit and obvious standard for 
behavior. In particular, we capitalized on the well-known speed–accuracy tradeoff in cognitive 
tasks, in which aiming for speed produces more errors and aiming for accuracy produces slower 
responses. Some participants were told the standard was to be fast; others were told the standard 
was to be accurate. As a result, patterns of response times and errors can reveal behavioral 
adherence to the speed and accuracy standards. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and design 
A total of 89 people (66 women, 23 men) enrolled in general psychology at the University of 
North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG) participated and received credit toward a research option. 
Each person was randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (Self-Focus: first-name priming vs. no 
priming) by 2 (Explicit Standard: speed vs. accuracy) between-person design. 
Procedure 
People completed the study individually. The experimenter explained that the study was about 
how people process information in the face of minor distractions. The task was a computer-based 
parity task (Wolford & Morrison, 1980), which presents a word flanked by two numbers (e.g., 2 
JACKET 3). People must ignore the word and decide if the two numbers have the same parity 
(both odd or both even) or a different parity (one odd, one even). This awkward task has a high 
rate of errors because the required categorization is unfamiliar and because the response mapping 
(i.e., “both odd” and “both even” on one key, “one odd, one even” on the other) competes against 
the intuitive “odd versus even” mapping. 
People received a sheet that described the task and contained the standard manipulation. The 
standard for the task was manipulated by explicitly instructing participants that they ought to opt 
for speed over accuracy (speed condition; e.g., “The standard that you should try to meet is to 
respond as fast as possible”) or accuracy over speed (accuracy condition; e.g., “The standard that 
you should try to meet is to respond as accurately as possible”). The experimenter orally 
reiterated the standard before the task. 
Self-focused attention was manipulated with subliminal first-name priming. Participants were 
told that they would see brief flashes of different letters, presumably as part of the study's interest 
in performance despite minor distractions. After a 1,000 ms pause, each trial began with a 
fixation cross (250 ms) followed by the prime (27 ms), which was either the participant's first 
name (first-name priming condition) or a random-letter string (no priming condition). The prime 
was followed by a random-letter mask for 100 ms, which was followed by the parity trial. The 
parity problem remained on the screen until the participant responded. The parity task consisted 
of eight practice trials followed by six blocks of 16 trials (eight same parity, eight different 
parity). Responses were measured with a Cedrus RB-620 response pad, which has a timing 
accuracy of 1 ms. After completing the task, people completed a brief questionnaire and had a 
funneled debriefing that asked about awareness of the name prime. No participants reported 
seeing their first name. 
A two-group pre-test (n = 32) suggested that this priming method successfully raises self-focused 
attention. Relative to random-letter priming, first-name priming significantly increased scores on 
the Linguistic Implications Form (LIF; Wegner & Giuliano, 1980, 1983), Mann–Whitney Z = 
2.16, p = .031, a scale that measures self-focus via how often people complete ambiguous 
sentences with first-person singular pronouns. The LIF is one of the most widely-used measures 
of state self-focus (Abele, Silvia, & Zöller-Utz, 2005; Salovey, 1992; Silvia & Abele, 2002; 
Silvia & Eichstaedt, 2004; Silvia, Phillips, Baumgaertner, & Maschauer, 2006; Snow et al., 
2004). Notably, first-name priming didn't affect positive or negative affect (both Fs < 1), 
measured with the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), so the effects of priming were 
specific to self-focused attention and consistent with our expectation that priming wouldn't affect 
conscious moods.1 
In addition, past research suggests that first-name priming successfully increases self-focused 
attention. In a study of mental control, Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne (1998) found that 
presenting people's last names for 30 ms influenced the self-regulation of social stereotypes in 
the same manner as conventional self-awareness manipulations. In a recent study, presenting 
people's first names for 27 ms during a cognitive task significantly increased cardiovascular 
markers of effort (Silvia et al., 2011a), which suggests greater attempts to meet the task's 
standard. 
Results and Discussion 
Errors 
Did subliminal first-name priming influence self-regulation to the explicit standard? A repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) estimated the effects of the priming and standard 
manipulations across the six blocks of trials; the effect for blocks was modeled via a 1-df within-
person contrast for linear change across blocks. This analysis revealed a significant three-way 
interaction between Priming, Standard, and Block, F(1, 85) = 7.94, p = .006. Regarding lower-
order effects, there were significant main effects of the Standard manipulation, F(1, 85) = 20.56, 
p < .001, and Block, F(1, 85) = 23.18, p < .001. The Priming main effect (F < 1), the Block-by-
Priming interaction (F < 1), and the Block-by-Standard interaction, F(1, 85) = 2.45, p = .122, 
were not significant. Table 1 shows the results for each condition. 
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Figure 1 depicts the significant three-way interaction. As expected, first-name priming increased 
adherence to the standard, particularly on the earlier trials. When people had an explicit standard 
to be fast, first-name priming significantly increased the number of errors for the first two 
blocks. When people had an explicit standard to be accurate, however, first-name priming 
significantly reduced the number of errors for the first and third blocks. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 Effects of first-name priming and explicit standards on errors: Experiment 1. 
 
Response times 
A similar repeated-measures ANOVA estimated the effects on response times across the six 
blocks. This analysis revealed a significant three-way interaction between Priming, Standard, and 
Block, F(1, 85) = 3.94, p = .050. Regarding lower-order effects, there were significant main 
effects of the Standard manipulation, F(1, 85) = 43.42, p < .001, and Block, F(1, 85) = 20.12, p < 
.001, and a marginal main effect of Priming, F(1, 85) = 3.42, p = .068. Neither the Block-by-
Priming interaction (F < 1) nor the Block-by-Standard interaction, F(1, 85) = 1.71, p = .195, was 
significant. Table 1 shows the results for each condition. 
Figure 2 depicts the significant three-way interaction. When people had an explicit standard to be 
fast, first-name priming significantly reduced response times. In particular, people in the first-
name priming condition were significantly faster early in the task: the effect of priming 
diminished across the blocks, becoming non-significant for the fifth and sixth blocks. When 
people had an explicit standard to be accurate, however, first-name priming didn't influence 
response times relative to no priming. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 Effects of first-name priming and explicit standards on response times: Experiment 1. 
 
Summary 
As expected, directing attention to self implicitly, via subliminal first-name priming, influenced 
behavioral self-regulation to a conscious, explicit standard. People in the first-name priming 
condition performed in a manner that reflected attempts to adhere to the standard. When told the 
standard was speed, they had faster response times and more errors; when told the standard was 
accuracy, they made fewer errors. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we explored the similarity of nonconscious and conscious influences on self-
focused attention by adding a mirror condition to the design. Presenting people with their 
reflection is a classic way of evoking self-focused attention, and it evokes conscious thoughts 
about the self and a subjective sense of feeling self-conscious (Govern & Marsch, 2001; Ickes, 
Layden, & Barnes, 1978). Theories of self-awareness predict similar effects for conscious and 
nonconscious sources of self-focus (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Duval & Silvia, 2001). Both 
activate self-regulatory processes aimed at reducing discrepancies, so both should have similar 
effects on behavioral regulation to an explicit standard. 
Method 
Participants and design 
A total of 164 people (111 women, 51 men, and 2 who declined to respond) enrolled in general 
psychology at UNCG participated as part of a research option. Each person was randomly 
assigned to condition in a 3 (Self-Focus: first-name priming vs. mirror vs. control) by 2 
(Standard: speed vs. accuracy) between-person design. 
Procedure 
The task and procedures were the same as in Experiment 1, except that we added a condition in 
which self-focused attention was manipulated with a mirror. In the mirror condition, people 
faced a 24′′ by 36′′ mirror placed on the desk. Unlike the first study, the monitor was angled so 
people could see the mirror throughout the task. In the first-name priming condition and the 
control condition, people faced the mirror's non-reflective back side. The experimenters justified 
the mirror by noting that they were borrowing the room and had been asked not to move 
anything. This method is one of the oldest (Carver & Scheier, 1978; Wicklund & Duval, 1971) 
and most commonly-used manipulations of self-awareness (Phillips & Silvia, 2005; Silvia, 
2002a, 2002b). 
The parity task was the same as in Experiment 1. After a 1000 ms pause, each trial began with a 
fixation cross (250 ms) followed by the prime (27 ms), which was either the participant's first 
name (First-Name Priming Condition) or a random-letter string (Mirror Condition and No 
Priming Condition). The prime was followed by a random-letter mask (100 ms) and then the 
parity trial, which remained onscreen until the participant responded. The task started with eight 
practice trials and then six blocks of 16 trials (eight same parity, eight different parity). 
Responses were measured with a Cedrus RB-843 response pad, which has a timing accuracy of 1 
ms. No participants reported seeing their first-name during the funneled debriefing. 
Results and Discussion 
Errors 
Did the priming and mirror manipulations of self-awareness have similar effects on behavioral 
self-regulation? A repeated-measures ANOVA examined the effects of the self-focus and 
standard manipulations on errors across the six blocks; as before, the effect of blocks was 
modeled via a within-person contrast for linear change across the six blocks. The three-way 
interaction was not significant, F < 1, but the Self-focus by Standard interaction was, F(2, 158) = 
7.63, p < 001. Regarding other effects, there were significant main effects of Block, F(1, 158) = 
18.83, p < .001, and Standards, F(1, 158) = 35.74, p < .001, as well as significant interactions 
between Standard and Block, F(1, 158) = 4.56, p = .034, and Self-focus and Block, F(2, 158) = 
4.32, p = .015. Table 2 displays the results for each condition. 
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Figure 3 depicts the significant two-way Self-focus-by-Standard interaction. As expected, both 
first-name priming and the mirror increased adherence to the performance standard. When the 
standard was to be fast, people in the mirror, t(52) = 2.93, p = .005, and name priming, t(53) = 
2.37, p = .021, conditions made significantly more errors than people in the control condition. 
When the standard was to be accurate, people in the mirror, t(53) = 1.96, p = .055, and the name 
priming, t(52) = 2.09, p = .042, conditions made significantly fewer errors than people in the 
control condition. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3 Effects of self-focus and explicit standards on errors: Experiment 2. 
Response times 
A similar repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on response times across the six blocks. 
This analysis revealed a significant three-way interaction between Self-focus, Standards, and 
Block, F(2, 158) = 4.30, p = .015. Regarding lower-order effects, there were main effects of 
Block, F(1, 158) = 83.32, p < .001, and Standard, F(1, 158) = 4.32, p = .015, and two-way 
interactions between Block and Self-focus, F(2, 158) = 3.23, p = .042, and Block and Standard, 
F(1, 158) = 12.36, p < .001. Table 2 displays the results for each condition. 
Figure 4 depicts the pattern of effects. When the standard was to be fast, people in the name 
priming and mirror conditions were significantly faster than people in the control condition for 
the first block; as in Experiment 1, the effect diminished across the remaining blocks. When the 
standard was to be accurate, the self-focus manipulation didn't systematically affect response 
times. 
 
 
FIGURE 4 Effects of self-focus and explicit standards on response times: Experiment 2. 
 
Summary 
Experiment 2 found evidence for the similarity of conscious and nonconscious sources of self-
focused attention. As in Experiment 1, manipulating speed–accuracy standards caused 
corresponding shifts in errors and response times when people were self-focused. First-name 
priming and a mirror caused similar patterns of behavioral self-regulation to an explicit standard, 
which suggests that they evoke the same self–standard comparison processes. 
General Discussion 
The comparison of self to goal states is a fundamental mechanism of behavior control (Carver & 
Scheier, 1981, 1998), so it ought to be versatile—it should execute effectively across a wide 
range of conditions and inputs. Past work has shown, for example, that this system can operate 
with diverse kinds of standards, such as goals at different levels of abstraction, concreteness, and 
modes of representation (Carver, 2003; Carver & Scheier, 1998). Self-focused attention, a core 
mechanism that activates the comparison of self with standards, appears to be similarly versatile. 
Directing attention to self explicitly (via a mirror) and implicitly (via first-name priming) had 
similar effects on behavioral regulation to an explicit standard. The dynamics of self-regulation 
were thus similar, suggesting that this is not a self-process that differs qualitatively across the 
implicit–explicit dimension. 
These findings enhance our understanding of the dynamics proposed by objective self-awareness 
theory, which was developed before social psychology's interest in automatic and implicit 
processes. The theory presumes that focusing attention on the self initiates a comparison of self 
against standards, and that this comparison is difficult to prevent, control, or disrupt (Silvia & 
Duval, 2001a). The outcomes may typically be conscious, such as self-critical thoughts, negative 
affect, and reduced state self-esteem, but the comparison process itself is presumed to operate 
automatically. The present research shows that this process can be evoked by directing attention 
to self outside of awareness and by presenting people with conscious self-images. These results 
support the theory's view that it is attention, not awareness per se, that initiates comparative 
processes (see also Carver & Scheier, 1981). 
Our experiment used an uncommon task standard—be fast or be accurate—relative to past self-
awareness research. The standards used in past work typically involved instructing people to “do 
their best,” such as to come as close as possible to a feared object (Carver, Blaney, & Scheier, 
1979) or to get as many items as possible right within a time limit (e.g., Duval & Lalwani, 1999). 
Other studies have used fixed-difficulty standards, such as responding within a fixed response 
window (e.g., Gendolla et al., 2008; Silvia, Jones, Kelly, & Zibaie, 2011b). And still other 
studies have used abstract self-evaluative standards, such as inner representations of close others 
(Baldwin & Holmes, 1987) or personal ideals (Phillips & Silvia, 2005). Speed and accuracy 
standards, while somewhat mundane, allow us to rule out some unlikely alternative explanations, 
such as the possibility that first-name priming facilitates dominant responses, increases arousal 
or alertness, or activates personal standards that override contextual ones. Because self-focus had 
opposite effects depending on the standard—some people made more mistakes, others made 
fewer mistakes—it seems likely that self-focus was causing behavior to align with the standard. 
The effects of self-focused attention—via both priming and mirrors—decayed across the six 
blocks of the task. Both experiments found strongest effects earlier in the task, and the conditions 
tended to converge toward the end of the task. There are many reasons why task performance 
changes across blocks of long cognitive tasks. Some are more interesting for cognitive 
psychologists than for self researchers—such as more efficient motor mapping with practice and 
the shift from computing to remembering answers—but others might represent interesting 
directions for future research. For example, the effects of name priming could decay due to 
habituation to the prime (which was presented for 100% of the trials; Silvestrini & Gendolla, 
2011) or to absorption of attention in the challenging cognitive task. Likewise, the effects of the 
explicit standards probably decayed due to goal neglect (Kane & Engle, 2003), the tendency for 
a task goal (in the present experiments, “be fast” or “be accurate”) to slip from one's mind as 
people become immersed in the rapid cognitive task. It would be interesting for future work to 
vary the proportion of primed trials and to vary the reinstatement of the task goal, such as 
through reminders or goal-relevant priming, to evaluate their influence on the time course of 
behavioral self-regulation. 
In both studies, error rates were more sensitive than response times to the manipulations. Both 
speed and accuracy standards caused shifts in errors, but only the speed standard caused 
systematic shifts in response times. This pattern may offer clues to the self-regulation strategies 
that were adopted during the task. Errors can be reduced by adopting a caution strategy, in which 
people insert an additional error-evaluation stage into the response process (e.g., Knowles & 
Delaney, 2005). This straightforward strategy is effective and easy to adopt, which probably 
explains the large differences in errors for self-focused and non-self-focused participants as well 
as the overall rise in response times. For response speed, in contrast, no similarly effective 
strategy is available—people can simply try to expend more effort (Gendolla et al., 2008; Silvia 
et al., 2010), which will increase performance somewhat despite the large influence of individual 
differences in the cognitive abilities relevant to the challenging parity task. An interesting 
direction for future work would be take a more fine-grained look at the self-regulatory strategies 
that self-focused people adopt, such as whether self-focus increases the likelihood of seeking a 
strategy, how effectively and consistently people apply it, and if people are aware of their task 
strategies. 
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Notes 
It is worth noting that the original theory proposed that the state of objective self-awareness was 
aversive (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), but later research soon modified this claim in light of 
contrary evidence (e.g., Ickes et al., 1973; Wicklund, 1975). As a result, we wouldn't expect a 
manipulation of self-focused attention to necessarily affect PA or NA. 
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